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Abstract
As World Trade Organization (WTO) member-
ship becomes almost universal, the Pacific
island countries stand out as the largest group
of outsiders. As the islands seek to replace
reliance on preferential trading arrangements
by competitive exports, market access and trade
facilitation have become key policy concerns. In
this context, WTO membership and regional or
bilateral trade agreements are complementary
institutions for increasing the potential success
of new exports. The WTO sets out agreed princi-
ples formarket access, andmembership includes
a dispute resolution process that provides re-
dress against unjustified obstacles to exports,
whilst trade facilitation in the sense of overcom-
ing particular cost-raising obstacles to trade is
better delivered by regional and bilateral agree-
ments. The argument is supported by evidence
from Pacific and other small island economies.
Key words: Pacific islands, trade facilitation,
WTO
Trade has always been important for the Pacific
islands, but they have found it difficult to de-
velop substantial exports beyond a handful of
natural resources. In the 1970s and 1980s, the
Pacific islands’ trade negotiations focused on
obtaining favourable market access for specific
primary or niche products, but by the end of
the century, this strategy was becoming
unsustainable. Economic geography (limited re-
sources, small and dispersed populations, dis-
tance from markets, and poor transport links)
has led to high costs and low volumes, so that
the future key for exports is identification of
niche tasks that can overcome the obstacles of
geography and difficulties of market access.
The world trading system has been changing
since the 1990s in terms of the following: (i)
peak institutions, as theWorld Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) superseded the pre-1995 General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and
the World Customs Organization (WCO)
assumed increasing significance; (ii) forms of
trade, with increasing importance of global
value chains; and (iii) lead issues, as trade facil-
itation has displaced tariffs and non-tariff bar-
riers in the policy headlines.1 These changes
occurred against a backdrop of falling transport
costs and the revolution in information tech-
nology that is transforming the situation of for-
merly isolated small island economies.2 This
1. These changes are analysed in Pomfret (2016). Non-
tariff barriers remain important, but as a leading trade pol-
icy issue, they have been displaced by trade facilitation
since the Uruguay Round Final Act terminated the major
quantitative restrictions (including the Multifibre Arrange-
ment (MFA)) and set out conditions for sanitary and
phytosanitary measures and technical barriers to trade.
2. Transport costs have fallen by both air and sea. In an
Asian Development Bank project presented at the 2015
Pacific Update Conference in Suva, Patricia Sourdin
estimated (by the cif-fob/fob measure) that between 1990
and 2013, ad valorem transport costs of 14 Pacific islands
to Australia fell from 9 to 6.5 per cent by air and from 7.5
to 4 per cent for sea transport. During this period, a variety
of value chains have been established in agricultural
products, cosmetics, jewellery and other sectors.
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article analyses these developments around the
theme of the relationship between multilateral
(WTO) and regional institutions or bilateral
agreements as frameworks for trade facilitation
in the Pacific region.3
In the twenty-first century, WTO member-
ship is essentially a commitment to abide by a
body of agreed world trade law. Membership
sends a signal to traders and export-oriented in-
vestors about acceptance of these rules and
gives access to a dispute settlement mechanism
(DSM) that has been successfully availed even
by small economies. Whilst the WTO sets out
principles relevant to trade facilitation (e.g.
transparency and non-discrimination, freedom
of transit, and avoidance of unnecessary fees
and formalities), theWTO is not a useful forum
for resolving specific sources of costs for inter-
national traders at or behind another country’s
border. Regional trade arrangements or bilat-
eral agreements offer a way to address trade fa-
cilitation issues, for example, by standardising
customs forms or single windows (as in Asso-
ciation of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN))
or by targeting specific practices in a bilateral
agreement (as Singapore and other ASEAN
members have frequently done since 2000).
The 1970s and 1980s
The first meeting of the South Pacific Forum
was initiated by New Zealand and held inWel-
lington in August 1971. Seven countries were
represented: New Zealand, Australia, Cook
Islands, Fiji, Nauru, Tonga and Western Sa-
moa. They agreed to meet annually, and at
the next meeting established the South Pacific
Bureau for Economic Cooperation in Suva
(now called the Pacific Islands Forum
Secretariat).
When Papua New Guinea (PNG) became
independent in 1975, a trade agreement was
negotiated such that PNG goods entered
Australia duty-free. In 1981, all Forum mem-
bers gained preferential access to Australia
and New Zealand under the South Pacific
Regional Trade and Economic Co-operation
Agreement (SPARTECA). In practice,
SPARTECA was especially important for
Fiji’s garment exports, which grew rapidly
after 1987.
Meanwhile, the 1975 Lomé Convention
granted most African, Caribbean and Pacific
(ACP) countries preferential access to the
European commonmarket. The Lomé Conven-
tion included some commodity-specific terms,
which were important for Fijian sugar exports.
Lomé preferences also benefited coffee, cocoa,
oil palm and coconut oil exporters in PNG,
the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, and tuna
exports from the Solomon Islands and PNG.4
Within the South Pacific Forum, there were
several examples of sectoral cooperation and
regional services delivery (Dornan & Newton
Cain 2014). Creation of the Pacific Forum Line
shipping company and Air Pacific led to
tensions about the distribution of benefits, and
both have been bought by individual nations.5
However, the University of the South Pacific,
established in 1968, the Forum Fisheries
Agency (established 1979) and the Partners to
the Nauru Agreement on fisheries (signed
1982, office established 2010) continue to be
successful cooperative ventures. Dornan and
Newton Cain (2014) provide other, less signif-
icant examples of successful collaboration and
also examples of failed initiatives.
In sum, in the 1970s and 1980s, there was
limited cooperation and no progress towards
freer trade amongst the Pacific islands. Rela-
tions with other countries were more important
than intra-Pacific integration. External
3. In this article, I use trade facilitation to broadly cover
simplification of trade procedures and reduction of the costs
of international trade, other than through reductions of tar-
iffs or non-tariff barriers such as quotas. For more back-
ground on trade facilitation and on twenty-first century
trade agreements, see Duval (2007), WTO (2011), Sourdin
and Pomfret (2012), Neufeld (2014) and, specifically on the
Pacific region, Anukoonwattaka (2012).
4. The European common market in 1975 consisted of
nine countries, but the preferential tariffs were part of the
acquis accepted by all new members of the Community,
or European Union as it has been called since 1993. Prefer-
ential accesswas especially important for tuna exporters be-
cause canned tuna exports from major competitors such as
the Philippines and Thailand faced the 24 per cent common
external tariff.
5. Fiji took over Air Pacific in the 1990s and rebadged it as
Air Fiji. In 2012, Samoa bought the Pacific Forum Line.
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developments provided non-reciprocal prefer-
ential access to markets in Europe and
Australasia, and the larger island economies
had become heavily dependent on preferential
treatment. Completion of the Uruguay Round
of multilateral trade negotiations in 1994 and
establishment of theWTO in 1995 destabilised
this policy environment.
From General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade to the World Trade Organization
Between 1947 and 1994 an increasing share of
world trade was conducted under the aegis of
the GATT. The contracting parties (23 in
1947 and 123 in 1994) agreed to abide by a list
of commitments, set out in 38 articles and
based on the fundamental principles of non-
discrimination and transparency. GATT is best
remembered for the eight rounds of multilateral
trade negotiations conducted by the contracting
parties in which tariffs were much reduced and
non-tariff barriers were also subject to some
control. GATT succeeded because, over five
decades, countries came to accept the benefits
of a liberal global trade regime based on agreed
principles and because the contracting parties,
for the most part, abided by the principles, even
though enforcement mechanisms were weak –
little more than permitting retaliation against
delinquent trade partners.
In 1994, the Final Act of the Uruguay
Round brought together this body of trade
law and specific commitments on tariffs and
agreement on major non-tariff barriers, as well
as incorporating areas previously excluded
such as agriculture, textiles and clothing, and
services. The Final Act also established a more
substantial administrating body, the WTO, and
a binding DSM. TheWTO began operations in
January 1995.6
The Uruguay Round Final Act had a direct
impact on Fiji’s garment producers. The
MFA had allowed the high-income countries
to impose detailed bilateral quotas on imports
from low-wage countries, and Fiji’s preferen-
tial access to the Australian market was
valuable because the market shares of the ma-
jor Asian garment-producers were restricted.
In the Final Act, countries committed to elimi-
nate MFA quotas within a decade, and the
quotas disappeared by the end of 2004. In
1999, the garment industry employed about
18,000 Fijians, and the number of factories
had increased from 27 in 1988 to 110 in 1999
(Morgan 2014, 328). By 2005, only 40 facto-
ries remained in business. There was some last-
ing benefit, as the remaining firms had gained
sufficient expertise to maintain market niches,
for example, supplying short-order high-
quality garments to Australian importers with
whom they had established links, but the
pre-1999 growth was clearly unsustainable.
More generally, establishment of the WTO
with its DSM posed a fundamental challenge
to the preference-based trade under Lomé or
SPARTECA. Such non-reciprocal arrange-
ments were clearly contrary to GATT’s non-
discrimination principle, because they neither
met the Article XXIV requirements for free
trade areas and customs unions nor fell under
the exceptions permitted for encouraging eco-
nomic development. Whilst third countries
had tolerated these preferential arrangements
before 1995, in the new environment they
would inevitably face judicial challenge.
Pacific Islands’ World Trade Organization
Membership
The WTO has 162 members, of which six
are Pacific island economies (Table 1). The
members are generally nation states, but some
sub-national customs authorities are members
(e.g. Hong Kong) and the European Union acts
as a single member. Other countries have ob-
server status, which means that they are in the
process of applying for membership.7 Cur-
rently, twenty-one membership negotiations
are under way, although some are stalled. Only
fourteen United Nations member countries do
not have WTO membership or observer status:
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
6. For more details of this historical evolution, see Pomfret
(2001, Part I).
7. The Holy See (the Vatican) is the only observer
exempted from the requirement to pursue accession
negotiations.
422 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies September 2016
© 2016 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
published by JohnWiley & Sons Australia, Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University
Eritrea, Federated States of Micronesia,
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Nauru,
Palau, San Marino, Somalia, South Sudan,
Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Tuvalu.
Three Pacific island countries (Fiji, PNG,
and Solomon Islands) acceded to the GATT
in 1993 and 1994, and became WTO
members in 1996. Despite being the most
populous Pacific island countries, as small
countries distant from Geneva, all three had
no permanent representatives at the WTO
and were limited in playing an active role
in the WTO, or even keeping abreast of
developments.
At the June 1999 Trade Ministers Meeting,
the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat proposed
establishing a shared representative office in
Geneva to facilitate representation of Forum
countries, both WTO and non-WTO members,
in WTO negotiations.8 A Forum representative
would be present at all WTO meetings, tasked
with observing WTO operations and reporting
on all issues affecting Forum members. The
WTO Secretariat assisted in establishing
the office. The Pacific Islands Forum Represen-
tative Office in Geneva officially began opera-
tions in July 2004. A major strategic purpose
of the Office was to follow developments in
the WTO negotiations and to act as a channel
of communication between the WTO and the
Forum members (Bowman 2005).9
The next three largest Pacific island countries
applied forWTOmembership in the second half
of the 1990s, but accession negotiations were
protracted. Tonga applied in 1995 and became
aWTOmember in 2007; concerns included loss
of tariff revenue and of future policy space.
Samoa’s application was lodged in 1998; the
accession process was characterised by gradual
reforms and was concluded in 2012. Vanuatu’s
negotiations were the longest (application in
1995, accession in 2012).
The timing of Vanuatu’s application was in
response to two factors. Since independence
in 1980, Vanuatu had pursued an import-
substitution strategy, which by the mid-1990s,
was considered a failure10; negotiators
accepted the desirability of opening up the
closed economy, although a consequence of
the import-substitution policies was that a
handful of producers were strongly opposed
to any reduction in protection.11 A second
8. The Forum Secretariat represents 16 countries: Austra-
lia, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia,
Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand,
Niue, Palau, PNG, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga,
Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
9. Commencing in 2004, the representative office also fa-
cilitated 6-month placements in Geneva to enable trade of-
ficials from Forum members to work with the WTO on
issues important to their countries, and to promote
capacity-building across a range of trade issues.
10. Amongst other things, despite restrictions on imports,
the merchandise trade deficit amounted to between 15 and
38 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) during the
1990s (Gay 2012, Table 1).
11. Althoughmanufacturing only accounted for 3 per cent of
GDP, six ‘vocal manufacturing companies’, producing ice
cream, wooden furniture, toilet paper, fruit juice, corned beef
and sawn timber, were protected by import tariffs of 35 per
cent (Gay 2012).
Table 1 Pacific Island Countries and the WTO
WTO members (joined) Population Non-members Population
Fiji (1996†)‡ 861 Federated States of Micronesia 104
Papua New Guinea (1996†)‡ 6,859 Kiribati 98
Solomon Islands (1996†) 526 Marshall Islands 52
Tonga (2007) ‡ 104 Nauru 10
Samoa (2012) ‡ 186 Palau 20
Vanuatu (2012) ‡ 236 Tuvalu 10
†acceded to GATT in 1993 or 1994;
‡WCOmember. ThePacific IslandsForumhas observer status to theWTOCommittee onTrade andDevelopment on ameeting-
by-meeting basis and to the Committee on Trade and Environment. The Table only includes members of the United Nations.
WCO, World Customs Organization; WTO, World Trade Organization.
Source: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/status_e.htm (accessed 2 July 2015). UN population data, in thousands,
from http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-Data/population.htm
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impetus was that by 1997, Vanuatu’s neigh-
bours and principal trade partners (Fiji, PNG,
Solomon Islands, Australia and New Zealand)
were all WTO members. This led to a feeling
that trade relations might be enhanced by
membership.
Vanuatu had virtually completed its
negotiations by 2001 when the Minister of
Trade suspended the process. Vanuatu’s initial
accession strategy was excessively technical,
and it did not sufficiently leverage political
capital in the region and in Geneva to its
advantage. There was little discussion in
Vanuatu to convince stakeholders of the
benefits of accession, which was supported
by a thin constituency of officials involved in
the negotiations.12 On the other side of the
negotiating table, WTO members pursued a
‘one-size fits all’ negotiating strategy, which
failed to appreciate Vanuatu’s limited adminis-
trative capacity. In particular, because Vanuatu
was first in line of a group of least-developed
countries, WTOmembers were wary of setting
precedents. The WTO secretariat played a
limited role in the initial accession process, per-
haps reflecting the infancy of the organisation.
By the time that Vanuatu returned to the
negotiating table in 2007, all of these condi-
tions had changed (Basnett 2013). The WTO
established accession guidelines for least-
developed countries in 2002, 13 and the
Secretariat built expertise to assist candidates
for accession.More fundamentally, the attitude
of the high-income countries towards
providing assistance for trade facilitation, and
for WTO accession, changed. The concept of
Aid for Trade was popularised after the
2005G7 summit. Indicative of this shift and its
implication for Pacific islands was the presence
of Vanuatu’s Roy Joy as an invited participant
at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development November 2008 Policy
Dialogue on Aid for Trade in Paris.
In the reactivated negotiations, Vanuatu
sought and welcomed assistance from the
Pacific Forum (and bilaterally from the
Forum’s richest members, Australia and New
Zealand) as well as from the WTO Secretariat.
The negotiators were careful to keep the
government informed of all aspects of the
negotiation process, and also ensured wide-
spread dissemination of information about this
process. This succeeded in assuaging popular
preconceptions of ‘recolonization’ or that
Vanuatuwas being forced to accept ‘WTO-plus’
terms for accession (Gay 2012), and in garnering
support from domestic stakeholders, for
example, several non-government organizations
who previously opposed WTO-accession be-
camemore aware of the benefits for the commu-
nity. Of course, some stakeholders remained
opposed to membership, such as the protected
producers mentioned earlier, or people in the
retail sector who feared the inflow of foreign
competition if Vanuatu made any commitments
under the agreement of trade in services.
There are several lessons from the Pacific
island countries’ WTO accession experiences.
First and foremost, WTO accession should
not be viewed as a technical process to be
completed as quickly as possible. It is
important to ensure that politicians in govern-
ment and in opposition are kept informed of
negotiations and that the wider population is
informed of the benefits and costs of acces-
sion. In the absence of such information, it
is easy for the WTO to be portrayed as an
external threat rather than a voluntary organi-
sation. If WTO Working Party members do
object to policies, the objections should be
assessed and, if they are in fact in the appli-
cant’s own interest, then reforms should be
introduced after domestic debate (as Samoa
did). Similarly, any fiscal implications of tax
12. Only five staffs from the departments of trade and cus-
tomswere involved in the negotiations, and they failed to com-
municate with the government, business, non-government
organizations or the wider community. This was later
acknowledged by the lead negotiator, Roy Mickey Joy, who
also failed to recognise that WTO members might be both
supportive of Vanuatu and protective of their own national
interests, for example, he was shocked that Australia and
NewZealand opposed Vanuatu’s agricultural export subsidies
(Grynberg & Joy 2000; Gay 2012)
13. See the webpage of the Sub-Committee on Least-
Developed countries at https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/devel_e/dev_sub_committee_ldc_e.htm. For an
external report, see ‘New WTO rules ease entry for least-
developed countries’, The Guardian (London), 6 July
2012, at http://www.theguardian.com/global-develop-
ment/2012/jul/06/wto-rules-least-developed-countries.
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reform can be addressed gradually (as Tonga
did). Finally, technical and aid-for-trade
financial assistance are available from the
WTO, other multilateral organisations and
bilaterally, although applicants should not be
surprised if bilateral donors have national
interests that they wish to protect.
The last point highlights the evolution of
the WTO, whose Secretariat has developed
experience and expertise relevant to the
accession of small poor countries, that is,
the majority of new members since 1995.
The reluctance of Pacific islands to join
the WTO appears to be primarily due to
size and location, which make negotiations
in Geneva difficult. However, these reser-
vations have become less relevant in part
because the larger Pacific island economies
were pathfinders and also because the
regional organisation has fostered coopera-
tive action.
In the twenty-first century, WTO mem-
bership is less onerous than in the previous
century, when GATT signatories partici-
pated in rounds of trade negotiations whose
costs and benefits may have been hard for
a small country to assess. Today, not being
in the WTO and agreeing to abide by the
globally accepted international trade law is
anomalous. The anomaly is highlighted by
the fact that Pacific islands and Timor-
Leste account for half of the UN members
neither in the WTO nor negotiating acces-
sion, and that the other countries in this
group are either microstates without trade
policy independence (Monaco and San
Marino) or are outlaw or failed states
(Eritrea, North Korea, Somalia, South
Sudan and Turkmenistan).
Costs and Benefits of World Trade
Organization Membership
The costs and benefits of WTO membership
are unlikely to be dramatic. The main costs
are in terms of constrained future policy space
and of monitoring developments. For a small
open economy, WTO rules are consistent with
desirable policies, and any significant exemp-
tions can be included in the accession protocol
(Liu 2014). Viewing the WTO as a body of
accepted international trade law, there is little
need to monitor change, especially if accep-
tance of future changes is not mandatory.14
Taking advantage of the dispute resolution
mechanism offers challenges to small econo-
mies with limited resources, but there are
sources of support for legal action and, as the
Antigua case (described later) showed, success
is possible even for the smallest countries.
World Trade Organization members benefit
from the existence of international trade law.
For the most part, this is a passive benefit
because other WTO members observe the
law. Occasionally, it may be necessary to
enforce rights, and an important advantage of
the WTO is that any member can bring a case,
and there aremany examples of small countries
successfully reversing harmful actions by
large trading partners. The first ever WTO
dispute involved a challenge by Venezuela of
United States treatment of petroleum imports;
Venezuela won the DSM case, and the United
States changed its policies in line with the
panel’s judgement. When Ecuador won a case
against the European Union’s banana import
policies, the large trade partner again accepted
the need to comply with the DSM judgement.
The point is that even powerful trading nations
would rather maintain the WTO’s legitimacy
and credibility than defend specific national
advantages.
An interesting case from the Pacific islands’
perspective concerned a niche service export
by a small island economy, Antigua, to the
United States. After Antigua began to export
online betting services to Americans, the US
authorities introduced measures to restrict the
trade. Antigua took the case to the WTO,
where the DSM panel found in its favour in
2005. The United States claimed that omission
of online gambling from the list of services that
14. MajorWTO agreements, such as the 1997 Information
Technology Agreement to eliminate all tariffs on a speci-
fied list of information technology goods, have been
plurilateral, meaning that implementation is voluntary. By
contrast, the Doha Development Round, which was initi-
ated in 2001 as a successor to the GATT-era multilateral
trade negotiations, has been inconclusive because consen-
sus amongst 162 negotiators is elusive.
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it excluded from coverage under its accession
to the 1994WTOGeneral Agreement on Trade
in Services had been an oversight, but this
carried no legal weight, and the judgement
was upheld on appeal in 2007 (James
2007).15 Apart from the success of a small
island state (population about 80,000 in 2005)
vis-à-vis the world’s largest trading nation,
the case illustrated the value of DSM access
when a country is stymied from diversifying
its exports. Antigua’s online gambling exports
were a newly-developed niche export, and a
lesson is that the benefits from WTO member-
ship may accrue in an unpredictable future
context.
The indirect benefits come from the
signalling effect. WTO membership sends a
signal that a country abides by world trade
law. This is important for traders in other
WTO member countries and also for foreign
investors; a foreign investor may not come
to a country just because it is a WTO
member, but not being a WTO member
may deter foreign investors. In sum, it is
difficult to demonstrate precise tangible
benefits from WTO membership, but the
protection of market access rights and the
signalling effect are potentially important
for small economies. Against these small
but definite benefits, have to be set the limi-
tation of policy space and the financial cost
of negotiating WTO access and of monitor-
ing WTO developments, which are today
trivial and transient for the small open econ-
omies of Pacific Forum members.
Pacific Islands and Regional Trade
Agreements Since 1995
The Pacific Islands are not insulated against
change in the global economy. The preferential
treatment they received as colonies and after
independence through Lomé or SPARTECA
is no longer admissible in a world where the
WTO has superseded GATT. This is also a
world where international trade increasingly
involves trade in tasks within international
supply chains and, associated with this change,
trade negotiations are primarily about trade
facilitation.
In 1999, the European Union, concerned
about the WTO-incompatibility of the Lomé
Convention, announced that it would negotiate
a new reciprocal trade agreement with the ACP
countries, and the 2000 Cotonou Agreement
provided for negotiation of Economic Partner-
ship Agreements (EPAs) with the Pacific
islands. Partly in response to this, Australia
and New Zealand in 2001 signed the Pacific
Agreement on Closer Economic Relations
(PACER) with the Pacific Forum islands,
which were negotiating trade liberalisation
amongst themselves under the Pacific Island
Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) with a
target of removing tariffs on intra-PICTA trade
in most goods by 2021. In the early 2000s,
there was a fundamental division between the
Pacific island countries, who argued the need
for special treatment to offset their vulnerabil-
ity as isolated island economies, and the EU
(European Union) and Australia and New
Zealand who saw negotiations as a route to
WTO compatibility. This came to a head as
the WTO waiver for Lomé trade preferences
was due to expire at the end of 2007.
In 2007, the EU announced the running
down of the sugar protocol for ACP partners,
and guaranteed prices were phased out by
2012. Direct and indirect employment in Fiji’s
sugar production numbered around 200,000
or 20 percent of the work force in 2011 (IMF,
2011). Some producers have gained a price
premium through fairtrade certification, but
most will have to find other work (Morgan
2014, p. 327). Tariff reduction in Australia
and New Zealand eroded the margin of
protection for Pacific island exporters to
those markets, and termination of the MFA
destroyed much of Fiji’s garment industry.
Other activities that had benefited from prefer-
ential tariff treatment, such as the Japanese-
owned factory producing electrical wiring
harnesses for cars in Samoa for the Australian
market, also cut back production as preference
margins were eroded.
15. The Antigua case dispelled the argument that small
countries lack the capacity to pursue a DSM case, although
concerns remain about their ability to effectively enforce
and monitor the outcome (Jackson 2012).
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The largest Pacific island countries, PNG
and Fiji, signed reciprocal EPAs with the EU
in order to avoid loss of preferential access to
European markets, but other islands were
unwilling to do so. If the Pacific islands were
to accept full reciprocal free trade, then they
may as well eliminate their tariffs and join the
WTO, which most of them were still wary of
in 2007 (Table 1). Australia and New Zealand
responded by offering to take their negotiations
beyond-trade issues, and between 2007 and
2009, they negotiated the launch of PACER-
Plus negotiations, which begun in October
2009.16 However, PACER-Plus negotiators
progressed slowly in large part due to continu-
ing dissonance between the position of
Australia and New Zealand, who envisaged a
WTO-consistent trade agreement that would
not create precedents of exceptional treatment,
and the Pacific islands that expected excep-
tional treatment (Morgan 2014). Attempts to
include labour migration as a distinctive feature
with favourable treatment for Pacific islanders
were rebuffed by Australia and New Zealand,
which preferred separate migration protocols
rather than treaty obligations.
Prospects for Pacific Island Economies
The Pacific islands are still comparatively
young nation states, and it should be no
surprise that their development strategies
continue to evolve in response to their own
experiences. With respect to trade policy, they
have mostly pulled back from the ill-starred
import-substitution policies adopted soon after
independence. This is in step with global expe-
rience that has seen wholesale policy shifts
away from import substitution strategies, and
as a consequence, the great increase in WTO
membership as low and middle income
countries adopt more outward-oriented devel-
opment strategies. The Pacific islands have
partially followed this route, with six countries
now WTO members, but the number of non-
WTO members in the region is exceptionally
large, reflecting ongoing distrust of globalisa-
tion. Another manifestation of this distrust,
centred on concerns about ability to compete
on a flat field, has been the clinging to quasi-
colonial preferential access to the markets of
former imperial powers or neighbouring high-
income countries via Lomé and SPARTECA
and their successors. That approach is
clearly defunct in today’s global economy, as
‘arguments for special treatment have, in the
main, fallen on deaf ears in Brussels, Canberra
and Wellington’ (Morgan 2014, 334).
What then can the Pacific islands do? They
can follow the by now well-trodden path of
recognising the WTO’s pre-eminence in world
trade law and joining the organisation. A
similar case can be made for joining the
WCO, the other body whose standards and
norms are acknowledged by almost all
countries in the global economy, and whose
importance has increased as greater attention
is being paid to trade facilitation.17 At the same
time, they can follow a second well-trod path
of using bilateral or regional agreements to
tackle trade facilitation issues.
Beyond the general obligations of non-
discrimination and transparency for WTO and
WCO members, trade facilitation concerns
specific costs of international trade often
associated with domestic regulations either at
or behind the border. Such costs are best met
by establishing regional norms, such as the
open borders of the EU’s Schengenland or
the common customs forms and single
windows of ASEAN, which involve deeper
integration than simply removing tariffs on
intra-regional trade, or by bilateral agreements
to remove obstacles identified by the signato-
ries. The shift from classic free trade areas or
customs union to deeper integration was
16. This was in the context of Australia embracing bilat-
eral trade agreements. Before 2000 it only had agreements
with New Zealand and SPARTECA, but subsequent bilat-
eral agreements entered into force with Singapore in 2003,
with Thailand and with the United States in 2005, and with
Chile in 2009. Further bilateral agreements have entered
into force since 2009 between Australia and Malaysia
(2013), South Korea (2014) Japan (2015) and China
(2015), and more are under negotiation.
17. The WCO has 180 members, who account for 98 per
cent of world trade. Only four Pacific islands are WCO
members: Fiji (since 1997), Samoa (2001), PNG (2002),
Tonga (2005) and Vanuatu (2009).
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already apparent in the major integration
agreements of the 1980s and early 1990s (the
EU Single Market, the North American Free
Trade Agreement, and Closer Economic
Relations between Australia and New Zealand).
Since 2000, bilateral and other trade agreements
have proliferated, especially in Asia, which had
largely been absent from previous waves of
trade agreements (Pomfret 2011). The country
signing the most post-2000 trade agreements
is Singapore, which has zero tariffs practically
across the board, highlighting that Singapore
is interested in reducing trade costs rather than
negotiating mutual reduction in tariffs.
In the South Pacific, regional trade negotia-
tions move slowly because large trading part-
ners are no longer willing to offer preferential
access to their markets and the small islands
are reluctant to sign free trade agreements
with reciprocal tariff-free access. Regional
institutions can focus on reducing trade costs
(e.g. by simplifying and standardising customs
procedures and logistics), and developing
regional services such as certification and
testing to ensure compatibility with sanitary
and phytosanitary measures. For example,
Australia, whilst dragging its feet on PACER-
Plus, has been willing to provide funding for
a Pacific Horticultural and Agricultural
program that addresses market access issues.
Similarly, New Zealand has been willing to
assist Pacific islands to achieve the laboratory
certification necessary for their exports to meet
sanitary, phytosanitary and other standards, for
example, the New Zealand overseas develop-
ment agency’s assistance to Spices of Fiji.
Can WTO membership plus agreements to
reduce trade costs succeed for economies as
small and remote as the Pacific islands? Only
time will tell, but the other changes in the
global economy mentioned in the Introduction
will help. Falling transport costs, especially for
air-freight, can help the islands to export niche
products competitively. The IT revolution of
the last quarter century reinforces the erosion
of distance, as customers and suppliers can be
more easily sourced beyond the islands and
merchandise can be tracked. In sum, the Pacific
islands’ isolation is today less of an obstacle
to economic development than in the past,
although their size and location still represent
challenges; to create the best environment
for their countries to participate in the global
economy, policymakers should accept the
principles of WTO trade law and negotiate to
reduce specific obstacles to their countries’
exports.
April 2016.
Originally written as a background paper for
presentation at the 2015 Pacific Update Conference:
Pacific Development in a Changing Global
Economy held at the University of the South Pacific
in Suva on 15-16 July 2015. I am grateful to two
referees for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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